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PRESENT FRONTIERS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
WILLIAM T. COLEMAN, JR.t
This article was presented as an address to the Villanova
Law Forum on October 21, 1966. The author brings to this
topic many years of academic and practical experience in the
field of constitutional law. He received his Bachelor of Arts
degree from the University of Pennsylvania with honors in
1941. He then went on to Harvard Law School where he
was a member of the Editorial Board of the Harvard Law
Review and later a Langdell Fellow. Mr. Coleman was
awarded his Bachelor of Laws degree, magna cum laude in
1946, having taken out time for service in the armed forces.
He then served as Law Clerk to Judge Herbert F. Goodrich
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
and in the following year clerked for Mr. Justice Felix
Frankfurter of the Supreme Court of the United States. A
member of the Philadelphia Bar, Mr. Coleman is a partner in
the Philadelphia firm of Dilworth, Paxson, Kalish, Kohn
and Levy. He was one of the senior counsel for the Warren
Commission, and is a consultant for the United States Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency.
T HE EFFORT to understand American constitutional law and the
the role of the Supreme Court of the United States forces lawyers
to become philosophers. Indeed, Alfred North Whitehead has, not
perhaps without a twinkle in his eye, described the role of the Supreme
Court in terms of aesthetics. His suggestion that the Court is seeking
to bring the Constitution into civilized harmony with the conditions
of contemporary America contains an important truth. Earlier, John
Marshall expressed a similar thought in legal terms when he made
his famous pronouncement that "it is a constitution we are expounding,"
that is, a document that must live and evolve to serve future generations
as well as those of the present.
tMember of the Philadelphia Bar. A.B., University of Pennsylvania, 1941;
LL.B., Harvard University, 1946.
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To describe, therefore, the constitutional frontiers of the next
decade is to forecast the ,trend of contemporary America. For as that
perceptive Frenchman, de Toqueville, observed many years ago, most
of the problems of American society - whether of industry, agricul-
ture or finance, of racial interaction, of religious freedom, of urban
decay, of rotten political boroughs, or of the eternal conflict between
liberty and authority - sooner or later become legal problems for
ultimate solution by the Supreme 'Court.
Today our society still churns. We are faced with many un-
resolved social, political and moral problems. And thus those who feel
that the present Term of the Court will be extremely dull have missed
the point. It is a reflection of our acceptance of the Court as the
final arbiter of great social issues that such problems as press freedom
versus privacy,' the 1963 "jury-fixing" conviction of Jimmy Hoffa,
despite the presence of a Government informer at Hoffa's lawyers'
conferences, 2 such anti-trust cases as Procter & Gamble's acquisition of
Chlorox Chemical Company,3 such issues as double jeopardy,4 as right
of counsel and the procedures to be followed in juvenile courts,5 and
as self-incrimination arising out of the federal law which requires
gamblers to buy a tax stamp for fifty dollars, pay a tax of ten per cent
on all bets taken, and to divulge all clients' names and addresses,6 cases
involving atheists and nudists,7 obscenity and miscegenation,' the
question of whether a "beatnik" is necessarily disqualified as a fit
father,' and tax exemptions for churches,'0 are now considered anti-
climatic after ten years of racial integration litigation and decisions
which established the concept of one man, one vote. The docket in
1. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 15 N.Y.2d 986, 207 N.E.2d 604, 260 N.Y.S.2d 7, rev'd, 35
U.S.L. WtK 4108 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1967).
2. Hoffa v. United States, 87 Sup. Ct. 408 (1967).
3. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 358 F.2d 74 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 385 U.S.
897 (1966).
4. Cichos v. Indiana, 208 N.E.2d 685, rehearing denied, 210 N.E.2d 363 (Ind.
Sup. Ct. 1965), cert. granted, 383 U.S. 966, petition for cert. dismissed, 385 U.S.
76 (1966).
5. In re Gault, 99 Ariz. 181, 407 P.2d 760 (1965), prob. juris, noted, 384 U.S.
997 (1966).
6. Grosso v. United States, 358 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. granted, 35 U.S.L.
WnnK 3124 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1966) (No. 181) ; Costello v. Umted States, 352 F.2d 848
(2d Cir. 1965), cert. granted, 383 U.S. 942 (1966).
7. Rosenbloom v. Virginia, Va. Sup. Ct. App. (Apr. 27, 1966), petition for cert.
filed, 35 U.S.L. WxsK 3089 (U.S. July 19, 1966) (No. 366).
8. Gent v. Arkansas, 393 S.W.2d 219 (Ark. Sup. Ct. 1965), prob. juris, noted,
384 U.S. 937 (1966) ; Austin v. Kentucky, 386 S.W.2d 270 (Ky. Ct. App. 1965), cert.
granted, 384 U.S. 916 (1966); Redrup v. New York, N.Y. App. Div., 1st Dept., cert.
granted, 384 U.S. 916 (1966); In re Loving, Va. Sup. Ct. App., appeal filed, 34 U.S.L.
WizK 2491 (U.S. July 27, 1966) (No. 395).
9. Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa Sup. Ct.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 949 (1966).
10. Murray v. Goldstein, 241 Md. 383, 216 A.2d 897 (1966), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 816 (1966).
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FRONTIERS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
any one Term of the Court, moreover, is episodic, not philosophical, and
affords no basis for prediction of the long range interests or concerns
of the Court. For, as previously stated, these long range concerns will
be nurtured and developed by what America will become during the
next ten years.
Before discussing some of the long range concerns, we might
profitably spend a minute on an attempt to describe the present
functions of the Court in our democratic society. If Marshall, Story,
Taney, White or perhaps even Hughes, Brandeis or Holmes were asked
to give a capsule summary of their view of the function of the Supreme
Court in their day, they might well have replied as follows: First, since
we have a federal state, and powers are distributed between the center
and the circumference by a legal document, the Court must decide ques-
tions of conflict along the border where the power of the state and the
federal government meet and overlap. For, if any federalism is to
endure, some organ of Government must provide some checkrein on
the constituent units, and the history of the American colonies and
states made it inevitable that that checkrein should 'be a court and not
Congress. Justice Holmes wrote:
I do not think the United States would come to an end if we
lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think
the Union would be imperiled if we could not make that declara-
tion as to the laws of the several States. For one in my place sees
how often a local policy prevails with those who are not trained to
national views and how often action is taken that embodies what
the Commerce Clause was meant to end."
The second function, these Justices would no doubt reply, arises from
the Court's duty to deal with those restrictions, mainly upon the
federal government, which are applicable when that Government is
dealing with individuals, even where its actions are based upon the
sanction of majority vote.
Today, however, the Court, in addition to the two functions just
mentioned, is engaged in a third function which I will tentatively
describe as the function of setting the minimum standards of aspira-
tions and national goals so that we may become a fully civilized, open
society. The devolvement of this new function upon the Court results
in the main from a vacuum created by the default of other organs of
government, our federal and state executives, our federal and state
legislators and our state courts, as well as organizations of people who
discharge quasi-governmental functions. Unfortunately, our legislators
and governmental executives, our state judges and our citizens in posi-
11. HOLMIs, Law and the Courts, in COLLXCTD LZCAL PAPERS 295-96 (1920).
WINTER 1967]
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tions of great power have not performed this function as well as they
should. To say this, and to recognize the third function, is to explain
why many of the Court's decisions have been five to four and why the
results in some cases have been open to debate. As Chief Justice Hughes
reminded us in an address in 1936:
How amazing it is that, in the midst of controversies on every
conceivable subject, one should expect unanimity of opinion upon
difficult legal questions! In the highest ranges of thought, in
theology, philosophy and science, we find differences of view on
the part of the most distinguished experts - theologians, philoso-
phers and scientists. The history of scholarship is a record of
disagreements. And when we deal with questions relating to
principles of law and their application, we do not suddenly rise
into a stratosphere of icy certainty. 2
One must concede that a law court whose jurisdiction is based upon
case and controversy, which has the traditions of the common law,
and where judges are obliged to give reasoned answers, is perhaps
the least efficient of all organs of government to make moral judg-
ments which seek to divine the minimum standards of conduct which
government should be held to in dealing with its citizens and which
groups of individuals exercising societal power should use towards
other groups. Nevertheless, we must recognize frankly that the
Court on frequent occasions has, and will continue, to assume and
discharge this third function. This function is relatively new and
embraces the present frontiers of constitutional law. Thus, I predict
that the Court, and hence the lawyers here tonight, and those who
will be lawyers in the next few years, will be busily engaged over the
next decade in the solution of problems which have their genesis in
this third function.
Awareness of the concerns of a modern America forms the basis
for an informed guess as to the frontiers of law. What are the con-
cerns of modern America? I will suggest four. I know that the
fertile minds in this audience could make additional contributions;
but I am equally confident that the four I mention would be present
on the list of almost anyone in the audience.
First, we are spending considerable time and effort, thought and
money, in the field of foreign affairs in an attempt to discharge our
responsibility as a major world power. Secondly, we have recently
again become concerned that even though we are a nation of unbeliev-
able wealth, one-fifth of our citizens nonetheless remain in the grip of
unbelievable poverty. Even in prosperous America, 40 million people
12. Address by Chief Justice Hughes, 13 ALl PROCUDINGs 61, 64 (1935-1936).
[VOL. 12 : p. 223
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are poor, and some of our urban slums rival those of Caracas or Cal-
cutta. Thirdly, we feel those human problems which are generated by
the fact that the population of the country now exceeds 200 million
people, 75 per cent of whom live in urban centers, often centers which
were conceived to serve 18th and 19th Century needs. Finally, we are
engaged in the continuous struggle for the recognition of the individual
dignity of others as a matter of national obligation.
If you agree that the Court's primary concern is with modern
America, then you will have to agree that the novel issues which the
Court will 'be faced with in the next decade will probably be generated
by activities of our citizens 'in the areas just mentioned - foreign
affairs, poverty, urban decay and human dignity.
Let us spend a few minutes suggesting some problems which might
come before the Court. The first of these is in the field of foreign
affairs. Three years ago I got involved on behalf of the federal
government in the subject of arms control, particularly control of
nuclear weapons. One would think that constitutional law issues,
except perhaps for those involving the treaty-making power, when
Senate approval is necessary for agreements with foreign powers,
would be irrelevant or non-existent. The problems instead would seem
to be 'scientific or military - how to detect atomic explosions, the
physical effect thereof, the reliability and validity of seismographs, de-
fense against atomic weapons - but constitutional issues do lurk in
the background. As you know, the major stumbling block to an
atomic control treaty has 'been British and American insistence upon
the right of on-site inspection, that is, the right of any contracting
party to a nuclear control treaty to demand to inspect the territory of the
other upon the occurrence of an unexplained seismographic event. I am
sure you begin to perceive the lurking constitutional problem. Suppose
the United States suspected that General Motors, for example, had
atomic weapons stored in one of its plants or factories or that it was
testing with atomic material without Governmental permission. Could
an FBI agent, unannounced, go into the plant and search without a
search warrant? The answer is probably no. It would appear that a
search by the federal government without a warrant would be a clear
violation of the fourth amendment. You would also agree that if the
FBI agent went to a state police officer and said: "I can't make the
search without a warrant, will you make it for me?", that any resulting
search would likewise be a violation of the Federal Constitution. If
this is so, how can the United States by statute or treaty authorize
a foreign government - the Soviet Union, for example - to conduct
such a search without the consent of General Motors or a warrant first
WINTER 1967]
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issued by a federal court. And if the latter is required, would the Soviet
Union agree that its right to inspect could first be subjected to a hearing
by a federal court to see whether there was reasonable cause to issue a
search warrant?
Then, too, it is not too far-fetched to imagine that sooner or
later a case will be submitted to the Supreme Court of the United
States dealing with whether our -agents and governmental officials are
under constitutional restraints when they take action on behalf of the
United States outside the territorial limits of the United States. We
know that this issue reached the Supreme Court in the 1948 Term
when at the last minute lawyers for the convicted Japanese war
criminals asked the Court to review the convictions of General Tojo
and other Japanese officers by a military tribunal.'" The Court denied
review on the narrow ground that the tribunal which tried the Japanese
was an .international one, not one of the United States. In addition the
fact that MacAuthur was not acting in his capacity as an American
officer, and the extensiveness of the war power led the Court to the
conclusion that it was without jurisdiction.' 4 Of course, in time of
war, the war power and the recognition that war must be waged
effectively give the Executive and the military wide leeway, but
Ex parte Endo5 teaches that there are limitations even to the war
power. You will recall that in the Japanese Exclusionle cases, the
Court held that under the war power, the military could evacuate
Japanese citizens from the West Coast. However, in Ex Parte Endo,
the Court held that once the Japanese were moved to the Midwest, the
federal government had no power to hold them in camps there.'7
In Reid v. Covert,'" moreover, the Court after reargument held
that the wife of an American soldier who was living in Japan where
her husband was stationed could not be tried by a military court and
had the right to trial by jury even though her offense was committed
in Japan.
In other words, as we get increasingly involved in other areas of
the world, particularly without the legal clarification of a congressional
declaration of war, cases will develop presenting issues as to whether
United States officials can exert certain authority without constitu-
tional restraint over American nationals or foreign citizens where
13. Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1948).
14. Ibid.
15. 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
16. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)'; Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
17. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 302 (1944).
18. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
[VOL. 12 : p. 223
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the same official doing the same act in the United States would be
subject to such restraint.
Another lurking problem in the foreign affairs area is inherent
in the language of article III of the Constitution. Section 1 of article
III provides that the judicial power of the United States is vested in a
Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as -the Congress may from
time to time establish. Section 2 of the article specifically provides that
the federal judicial power extends "to controversies to which the
United States shall be a party." In other words, there is federal
jurisdiction if the United States is plaintiff or defendant, regardless
of the source of the applicable law - state, federal or international.
Where suit is brought against the United States by one of the fifty
states, or a citizen of a state, or a foreign citizen, it is clear that such
suit cannot be brought unless the United States consents. There is,
however, nothing in article III which requires this result. In fact,
article III was read in Chisholm v. Georgia19 as not requiring the
consent of a state to a suit by a citizen of another state. That decision
caused such indignation and apprehension that the eleventh amend-
ment was adopted. But the eleventh amendment deals only with suits
against one of the constituent states, not those against the federal
government. Thus, it is quite conceivable that a foreign state might
attempt suit against the United States in the original jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court.20 For example, the Peoples' Republic of North
Vietnam might sue the United States for declaratory relief as to
whether the President has constitutional authority to engage in a
major military action on foreign territory without a declaration of
war by 'Congress. Even though most responsible legal opinion con-
cludes that the President does have the authority, there are a few who
argue to the contrary. More realistically, France might sue the
United States to resolve a conflict over construction of obligations to
NATO.
Turning to the area of poverty - the second area of concern
it can be argued persuasively that Gideon, Escobedo, Miranda,"' and
the other decisions requiring the State to supply a defendant with
counsel in a criminal proceeding, even before the time of trial, find
a firmer basis in the concept that a civilized society should not place
one of its citizens at a disadvantage because of poverty than in the
theory that only counsel can ensure fair trial. As Judge David L.
19. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 418 (1792).
20. But cf. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
21. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) ; Escobedo v. Illinois, 375 U.S.
902 (1963) ; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
WINTER 1967]
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Bazelon of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit was quoted recently as saying:
The rights are all up there. Some people, because they have money
and intelligence, are tall enough to reach them. Others, because
they're poor or ignorant, are too short. Do you say that is
just too damned bad? Or do you give the short guys a box to
stand on? The box is information about their rights.2
If the real rationale of Gideon and Escobedo is deemed to be
our attitude towards poverty, should there not be instances in which
the Government has to supply legal representation to the poor even
though the controversy is civil. For example, if the Government
(state or federal) seeks to oust a tenant from a public housing project,
it is dubious whether the government should be able to have the benefit
of a lawyer, but, because of his poverty, not the tenant. Or the case may
arise in which the Government seeks to condemn property and the owner
is unable either to afford a lawyer to :represent him or to obtain one
on a contingent fee basis. Similarly, business, by the fact of its size,
can always afford counsel, while the individual, at least in the role of
defendant, must often allow his rights to go by default because ,he
cannot pay legal fees. Several recent decisions have suggested that
the in forma pauperis federal statute,2" allowing for counsel paid by
the Government in civil cases, points to a problem of constitutional
dimensions.2 4 Courts in California 2 5 and Rhode Island2" have held
that the common law itself requires the state to supply counsel in a
civil case to which the government is a party. Just the other day
Judge Stanley Greenberg, in the Common Pleas Court of Philadelphia,
held that a defendant in a civil commitment case had the right to a
court-appointed lawyer before a determination of mental competency
was made.
2 7
In the area of urban congestion and decay I predict there will
be more decisions requiring the suburbs to shoulder their share of the
responsibility for and cost of the urban complex whose benefits they
inevitably enjoy. For example, if the Court should recognize that
state-permitted de facto racial segregation arising from housing pat-
terns is as much a violation of the fourteenth amendment as state-
22. Life, Oct. 21, 1966, p. 41.
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
24. Cf. Adkins v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331 (1948).
25. Lewis v. Smith, 21 R.I. 324, 43 Atl. 542 (1899) ; Spalding v. Bainbridge, 12
R.I. 244 (1879).
26. Martin v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 176 Cal. 289, 168 Pac. 135
(1917).
27. Commonwealth ex rel. Miller v. Shovlin, __ Pa. D.&C.2d __ (C.P. 1966).
[VOL. 12 : p. 223
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imposed segregation, then it will follow in the large Northern cities
that the best way to end segregation is to establish school districts
which embrace whole urban complexes and which do not stop at
archaic political boundaries. It is doubtful that a state should be able
to defend itself under the fourteenth amendment by arguing that the
schools in Philadelphia, for example, can be no other than they are
because only a small percentage of the public school student body is
white. Since the state, rather than the City as a political sub-division,
is the real defendant in such a case, a federal court should not have to
close its eyes to the fact that the greater Philadelphia urban com-
munity has a predominantly white population, which is enjoying the
benefits of superior schooling in the counties surrounding the old city
of Philadelphia.
You will recall that the fourth area to which I referred was the
area of increasing recognition of and respect for the dignity of the
individual. The aspect of this problem which is of particular interest
involves the role of the Court in civilizing the dealings between groups
of people generally considered "private" - people not employed by
or clearly related to the government. The Supreme Court has, of
course, made it abundantly clear in the past that the government
and its officials, with the striking exception of its courts, may
never deal with individuals upon a basis which takes cognizance of
race or religion. Much less clearly developed is the area in which
private persons make their acts "public" by calling on the state's
courts to aid them in their dealings with other private citizens.
The early announcement in Shelley v. Kraemer28 that a state
court was "the state" and hence its enforcement of a racially restrictive
covenant was invalid state action under the fourteenth amendment, has
not been followed down the broad, but problem-fraught, way it
pointed. The idea that "private" action may 'have to answer to the
strictures of the fourteenth amendment is at least as old as the voting
cases. 29 Shelley served to give it new life by developing the theory that
state courts were co-equally responsible with the executive and legisla-
tive branches. This idea was kept alive in the dissents in Rice v.
Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. 30 and Black v. Cutter
Labs.3" The majority in those cases, however, appeared indecisive
and reluctant to face the problem posed. There the matter stood until
the highly significant decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.
82
28. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
29. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944) ; Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
30. 349 U.S. 70 (1955).
31. 351 U.S. 292 (1956).
32. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
WINTER 1967]
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Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the multi-faceted New
York Times case is the fact that it arose from a "private" tort action
in a state court. Far-reaching free speech principles laid down by
the Court were directed to a rule of state common law. Mr. Justice
Brennan stated:
Although this is a civil law suit between private parties, the
Alabama courts -have applied a 'state rule of law which petitioners
claim to impose invalid restrictions on their constitutional free-
doms of speech and press. . . . The test is not the form in which
state power has been applied, 'but, whatever the form, whether
such power has in fact been exercised. 8
In the Rice case the Iowa Supreme Court held it was not "state action"
to allow in a tort case a defense 'based on a racially restrictive covenant,
and the Supreme Court by a four to four vote refused to resolve the
question on the merits.84 As a result of New York Times, the Court
now treats the granting by a state of an affirmative cause of action in
tort as "state action" governed by the fourteenth amendment.3 The
implications are far reaching. In a provocative recent article, 6 Pro-
fessor Louis Henkin suggests that this principle makes all private action
subject to fourteenth amendment standards when enforced by state
power (judicial or otherwise) except where some countervailing con-
stitutional guarantee forbids the state to refuse its aid. The proposi-
tion may be stated in other terms: If a state has constitutional power
to outlaw a private practice (for example discrimination in private
accommodations) it is powerless to enforce 'by judicial decision the
kind of private discrimination which it might outlaw, even though
enforcement is merely lending the aid of its judicial system.
To state the problem thus does not simplify the answer in a
given case, but it marks a shift in attitude which is highly significant
and with which the Court may be expected to 'be increasingly pre-
occupied. In short, the state may no longer assume its age-old, and
actually fictional, "neutrality" in matters of discrimination between
private persons. In general terms discrimination may be of two kinds:
it may be that of personal eccentricity and preference or that .of the
almost cultural exploitation by a dominant group of an oppressed group.
The former may be valuable and leaven society. The latter is always
insidious, 'because it carries with it a congeries of economic ramifica-
tions. In the latter area, for a state court to be "neutral" has tradi-
33. Id. at 265.
34. 349 U.S. 70, 75-77 (1955).
35. 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964).
36. Henkin, Shelly v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L.
Rev. 473 (1962).
[VOL. 12 : p. 223
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tionally meant for it to lend its powers to support the "have" group,
the dominant group, the group which commands the money, the educa-
tion and the motivation to use the legal system. Once it is recognized
that no decision can be a "neutral" one, we are well on the way to dis-
covering the true balances which must 'be struck. The Court may
decide that eccentric individual discrimination is a right of personal
liberty which the courts are constitutionally bound to enforce, and,
in fact, could not constitutionally outlaw. It does not follow that they
must likewise enforce, for example, restrictive covenants which give
rise to wide-spread "private" zoning. This approach to fourteenth
amendment decisions protects the free exercise of religion, however
eccentric or discriminatory, and it also protects private property.
These interests must be weighed in any given section against the
rights of other individuals to equal treatment. Such weighing will
increasingly become the business of the Court during the coming
decade.
A brief hypothetical case will illustrate the area I have been dis-
cussing - that of the testator who leaves his money to establish a
racially segregated school. First, it will be noted that the state cannot
constitutionally run a racially segregated school because such action
violates the equal protection clause. Second, a state statute which
outlaws private racially segregated schools is clearly constitutional.
Equally as clear, a man's will could not be probated and placed in
effect absent the power of the state, and a racial restriction is a
nullity unless a court will permit rights or duties to be based on it.
The state gives the right to leave property to one's descendents. Thus,
since the state cannot by statute or executive order create racially
segregated schools, why should the same result be achieved by the
employment of state judicial power. On the other hand, a state by
statute probably could not require anyone who had a dinner party at
his house to invite Negroes. Thus, if a Negro attempts to crash the
party, the state trespass statute most likely could be used. But this
is because the right of privacy has to be considered and weighed
against the right to be free of governmental action based upon race.
The answer requires a balancing of factors which it is not the purpose
to examine fully here. But clearly it is a delicate problem which
cannot be resolved through the use of catch phrases. This will be the
area in which the Court will struggle.
I note that I have now been talking for 25 minutes and so I will
end. Mr. Justice Frankfurter on 'several occasions stated that he was
always impressed with the fact that Pennsylvania lawyers could argue
the most important and complicated case well within the hour allotted
WINTER 1967]
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by the Supreme Court of the United States. He finally asked Mr.
Justice Roberts why this was so. Mr. Justice Roberts replied that this
was due to two salutary rules of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania:
(1) that the questions presented must always be set forth on one page
of the brief, and (2) the total time allowed for argument by one side
would not exceed 30 minutes.
But I do hope that you will draw at least the two following con-
clusions from my remarks:
1. That as long as this country attempts to solve its serious
political, social and moral problems in terms of the rule of law,
adjustments of conflicting interests will be made peacefully. The only
time that we were unsuccessful we 'suffered the tragedy of civil war.
2. The young lawyer should take 'heart and not feel that he was
born too late. Though denied the opportunity to argue Marbury v.
Madison, the Dred Scott case, Brown v. Board of Education, or
Gideon, he can rest assured that in the future, legal problems as
intriguing and as stimulating as those just mentioned will still come
before the Court, and as lawyers and judges you will have an oppor-
tunity to be where the action is. For better or worse, lawyers and
judges in this country are the social architects. As we strive to achieve
the type of society of which we can all be proud, take heart, lawyers
will have to fashion the ways and means in which to make adjustments
without too much human displacement.
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